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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California law, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal deci-
sions of special importance to women. A brief 
analysis of the issues pertinent to women raised 
in each case is provided. 
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I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. RAPE 
1. Testimony of defendant's psychiatrist in child abuse 
case held to be privileged despite Child Abuse Reporting Act. 
People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. 
Rptr. 431 (1983). In People v. Stritzinger, the court held that 
testimony of the defendant's psychiatrist obtained pursuant to 
the Child Abuse Reporting Act} was erroneously admitted at 
trial in violation of the psycotherapist-patient privilege.2 
The defendant and his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, Sa-
rah, sought treatment from a licensed clinical psychologist after 
the defendant allegedly engaged in various acts of fondling, mu-
tual masturbation, and oral copulation with the child. In the 
course of her individual therapy, Sarah revealed that she had 
engaged in sexual activity with the defendant. The therapist re-
ported the conversation to the child welfare agency that same 
afternoon, and indicated that he was scheduled to meet with the 
defendant later the same day. Despite expressed reservations 
about disclosing defendant's confidential communications, the 
therapist revealed the substance of his session with defendant 
when requested to do so in a follow-up inquiry by the investigat-
ing sheriff's deputy. The therapist was advised by the deputy 
that the Child Abuse Reporting Act provided an applicable ex-
ception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.3 
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165-11174 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1984). The court also held that the 
mother's testimony concerning the child's emotional difficulties was insufficient to sup-
port the trial court's finding that the child was unavailable as a witness and that there-
fore, the child's preliminary hearing testimony was erroneously admitted into evidence. 
34 Cal. 3d 505, 519, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 441 (1983). 
3. The applicable exception is codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171(b) (Deering 
3
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At trial, the defendant sought to have the therapist's testi-
mony excluded on the basis of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. The court held that Penal Code section 11171 (b)4 creates 
an exception to the privilege and ruled the testimony admissible. 
The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of child moles-
tation; the defendant appealed. 
Section 1014 of the California Evidence Codell provides that 
a patient, whether or not a party to a lawsuit, has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confi-
dential communication between patient and psychotherapist. 
However, to encourage the prompt investigation and prosecution 
of child abuse, the legislature carved out an exception to the 
statutory physician-patient privileges. Section 11171(b) provides 
in pertinent part: "Neither the physician-patient privilege nor 
the psychotherapist-patient privileges applies to information re-
ported pursuant to this article in any court proceeding or ad-
ministrative hearing."6 
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is codified in Califor-
nia Evidence Code section 1014.7 Section 1014 provides in part: 
"The patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential 
communication between patient and psychotherapist. . . ."8 As 
a matter of policy, California courts have broadly construed sec-
tion 1014 in favor of the patient,9 although no prior cases have 
dealt specifically with the exception provided in section 
11171(b). In In re Lifschutz/o the court, in construing the pa-
tient-litigant exceptionll to the privilege, recognized the consti-
tutional dimension of the privilege as well as the general need 
for confidentiality in psychotherapy, but held that the privilege 
Supp. 1984). 
4.Id. 
5. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171(b) (Deering Supp. 1984). 
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
8.Id. 
9. See Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 508 P.2d 309, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309 
(1973); Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977). 
10. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829. 
11. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1016 (Deering 1966). 
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is not absolute and must yield to compelling state interests.12 
The Stritzinger court noted that the clear legislative intent 
in the enactment of the Child Abuse Reporting Act is to protect 
children, and further, that this government concern is compel-
ling. Therefore, the court stated that section 11171(b) creates a 
specific exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but 
that the exception was erroneously applied under the facts In 
Stritzinger. 
The court found that Sarah's communications with the 
therapist were not privileged, were required to be reported 
under the Act, and were admissible at trial. It also determined, 
however, that the second report, that of the defendant's commu-
nications, at most only confirmed the therapist's earlier report 
and was not required to be disclosed under the Child Abuse Re-
porting Act. The court concluded that it would be inappropriate 
to apply the subdivision (b) exception to the second report and 
therefore did not allow admission of the evidence at trial. 
The court stated that if the psychiatrist was compelled to go 
beyond an initial report under such circumstances, 
candor and integrity would require the doctor to 
advise the patient at the outset that he will vio-
late his confidence. . . . Under such circum-
stances it is impossible to conceive of any mean-
ingful therapy. Ironically, in this case medical 
help was initially what this distraught family 
sought as a result of these tragic events. IS 
Justice Kaus concurred with the majority's holding that the 
testimony was admitted in error, but correctly disagreed with 
the majority's reasoning. He argued that the majority errone-
ously based its determination that the second report was op-
tional on the fact that it did not yield any new information. The 
solution to the conflict between patient's privacy concerns and 
the 11171(b) exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
according to Justice Kaus, is to apply the concept of waiver. Jus-
12. The Lifschutz court concluded that Evidence Code section 1016 compels disclos-
ure of only those matters which the patient has chosen to reveal by referring to them in 
litigation. 2 Cal. 3d at 432, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840. 
13. 34 Cal. 3d at 514, 668 P.2d at 744-45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38. 
5
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tice Kaus would prohibit the therapist from testifying to confi-
dential communications from the defendant-patient unless the 
proponent of the evidence first establishes that the patient, 
before talking to the therapist, had been made aware of the 
therapist's statutory duty to testify. 
The majority found the excuse of the privilege obviously ab-
horrent in a voluntary family therapy situation such as Stritz-
inger, involving the admission of the defendant's own incrimi-
nating statements. The court, however, paid lip service to the 
constitutional concerns presented by the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege rather than offering any rules for proper applica-
tion of the exception beyond the facts of Stritzinger. 14 Justice 
Kaus' proposed waiver rule seems to be a workable approach to 
legislation that has placed psychotherapists in a double bind 
which neither promotes effective therapy nor leads to successful 
prosecutions in family sexual abuse cases. 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Payments arising from "income protection" insurance 
policy are community property. 
In re Marriage of Donnelly, 142 Cal. App. 3d 135, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 756 (1st Dist. 1983). In In re Marriage of Donnelly, the 
court of appeal characterized payments arising from an "income 
protection" insurance policy as community property to the ex-
tent that community funds contributed toward the premiums. 
14. Justice Kaus wrote: 
It may be unfair to mention it-we have to take our cases as 
they come along-but something else which bothers me about 
the majority opinion is that it really does not decide anything 
except this case. Even if the facts supported the majority's 
conclusion, Dr. Walker would have been free to testify to de-
fendant's confidences if he had seen defendant before Sarah, 
or if defendant had related more serious or more frequent sex-
ual misconduct than Sarah. 
[d. at 523 n.4, 668 P.2d at 750 n.4, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 444 n.4. 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
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During marriage, the husband took out an "income protec-
tion" insurance policy using community earnings to pay the pre-
miums. The policy became payable upon the husband's total 
disability. Husband sustained job related injuries while still liv-
ing with his wife but the injuries did not culminate in total disa-
bility until after the parties separated. Upon dissolu~ion of the 
marriage, the wife claimed a community property interest in the 
policy. The husband argued that the payments were his separate 
property because they derived from his post-separation disabil-
ity rather than from pre-separation labor. The trial court re-
jected the husband's contention and he appealed. 
In support of his position, the husband cited In re Marriage 
of Jones 15 and In re Marriage of Flockhart. 16 In Jones, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that disability pay is not a commu-
nity asset because it is not compensation resulting from past ser-
vices rendered. Rather, it is compensation for loss of present and 
future earning capacity and personal anguish resulting from a 
disabled status. The benefits at issue in Flockhart derived from 
a statute17 enacted to protect laid off park employees. The 
Flockhart court reasoned that the statutory benefits did not 
stem from a contractual right in consideration for services previ-
ously rendered but, instead, represented present compensation 
for lost income, and therefore were analogous to disability pay-
ments. 18 Thus, the court in Flockhart held that the weekly layoff 
benefits were not community property. 
The Donnelly court disagreed with the husband and 
pointed out that in In re Marriage of Brown/9 the California 
Supreme Court had disapproved Jones. In Jones, the disability 
payments came from a fund contributed to by the employee 
rather than being gratuitous. For this reason, the Brown court 
likened them to pensions which had not yet vested. Brown held: 
15. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975). 
16. 119 Cal. App. 3d 240, 173 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1981). 
17. Redwood Employee Protection Program Act, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 
(1978) (tit. I codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ la-I, 79b, 79c, 79c·l, 79k-79q (1982) tit. 
II not codified (1982)). 
18. However, it is arguable that the right did accrue because of past contributed 
labor. Legislative creation of a compensation plan does not negate the fact that the right 
to receive benefits under it would not exist but for past contributed labor, nor does it 
preclude the plan having been created to induce or compensate for such labor. 
19. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). 
7
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"[P]ension rights, whether or not vested, represent a property 
interest; to the extent that such rights derive from employment 
during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to 
division in a dissolution proceeding. "20 
The Donnelly court pointed out that the "income protec-
tion" insurance policy contracted for during the marriage had 
been privately purchased, its provisions called for the payment 
of a flat sum over a fixed term, and it was maintained entirely 
with private funds. In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of 
Italy,21 the court held that'a life insurance policy, when pur-
chased during marriage and maintained with community earn-
ings, is a community asset and therefore subject to equal divi-
sion upon marital dissolution. Likening the income protection 
policy in Donnelly to a life insurance policy, the Donnelly court 
applied the rule stated in New York Life Insurance Co. and held 
the income protection policy to be community property. 
The court in Donnelly looked past the label of the plan to 
distinguish between "contributed to" plans, such as pensions 
and life insurance policies, and gratuitous plans derived solely 
from the benevolence of the employer. Thus, looking beyond the 
"disability plan" label, the court based its holding that the plan 
was community property upon the actual characteristics of the 
plan and upon a determination that community labor contrib-
uted toward its creation and/or maintenance. The court's result 
is consistent with the community property scheme in Califor-
nia-to divide equally those assets which are derived from the 
community and therefore belong to the community. 
2. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act is 
retroactive to date of issuance of McCarty decision. 
In re Marriage of Hopkins, 142 Cal. App. 3d 350, 191 Cal. 
Rptr. 70 (2nd Dist. 1983). The Court of Appeal in In re Mar-
riage of Hopkins, upheld a trial court's division of a military 
pension as community property. 
20. [d. at 842, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35. 
21. 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (,1923). 
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In a December 1980 dissolution proceeding, the trial court 
found a husband's military retirement pension to be subject to 
community property division. The husband appealed. Although 
the court found the trial court's decision to be an appropriate 
application of California law as it existed at the time, it analyzed 
the decision in light of the 1981 case McCarty u. McCarty 22 and 
the 1982 enactment of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act (the Act).23 
Prior to McCarty, it was well settled in California that mili-
tary pensions Were community assets subject to division in dis-
solution proceedings. This principle is the Fithian doctrine.24 In 
June 1981, the United States Supreme Court in McCarty u. Mc-
Carty, overruled the Fithian line of cases by holding that con-
gressional goals in creating a federal retirement plan had pre-
empted the field of community classification by state courts and 
that a community property division of such pay frustrated con-
gressional objectives. In September 1982, Congress enacted the 
Act. The Act effectively overruled McCarty and gave state 
courts the power to divide military pensions as community prop-
erty.25 The effect of the Act on California law is to reinstate the 
Fithian doctrine. 
On the issue of the retroactivity of the Act, the court first 
noted that, in at least one other California court of appeal deci-
sion, In re Marriage of Fellers,26 McCarty had been held not to 
be retroactive to cases final before it was decided. The Fellers 
court had reviewed the ramifications of giving McCarty retroac-
tive effect: "[It] would flaunt the rule of res judicata, upset set-
tled property distributions on which parties have planned their 
lives and unsettle judgments entered as long as 40 years ago."27 
In re Marriage of Hopkins, on the other hand, was not final 
• 
when McCarty was decided and was still pending appeal on the 
22. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
23. Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
1408). 
24. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974) 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 925 (1974). 
25. For a more detailed history of McCarty and the Act, see Survey: Women and 
California Law, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 763-65 (1982) and Survey: Women and Cali-
fornia Law, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 744-45 (1983). 
26. 125 Cal. App. 3d 254, 178 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1981). 
27. Id. at 257, 178 Cal. Rptr; at 37. 
9
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effective date of the Act. The Hopkins court stated three factors 
to be considered in determining retroactivity: "the extent of 
public reliance upon the former rule; the ability of litigants to 
foresee the coming change in· the law and whether retroactive 
application of the rule could produce substantial inequitable 
results. "28 
The court reasoned that public reliance on the Fithian doc-
trine was extensive because the Fithian decision was almost ten 
years old when McCarty was decided, whereas r~liance on Mc-
Carty had been short-lived. Therefore, it held that to extend the 
retroactivity of the Act would facilitate, rather than frustrate, 
the well-ordered functions of the law in this area. 
The court also pointed out that it had not been apparent 
that the United States Supreme Court would reverse the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in McCarty, since it had denied certiorari 
to In re Marriage of Fithian, which had presented an identical 
issue.29 Thus, there was no way for an attorney to predict the 
change McCarty presented. The court noted further that the is-
sue had been continually before Congress since 1969, making it 
reasonable for a litigant to anticipate legislative suppression of 
McCarty. 
Finally, the court stated that to refuse to give the Act retro-
active effect would produce inequitable results in that some of 
those entitled to a share of a military pension would not receive 
it merely because of the existence of a short-lived decision that 
stands in direct conflict with clear congressional intent. There-
fore, the court held the Act to be retroactive to the date of issu-
ance of the McCarty decision, thereby fully reinstating.pre-Mc-
Carty law. In so doing, the court brings continuity and stability 
to an area of the law that previously had been characterized by 
rapid and conflicting change. 
28. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 357, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
29. Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974) cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 825 (1974). 
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3. Term life insurance policy not community property. 
In Re Marriage of Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d 464, 194 Cal. 
Rptr. 237 (2nd Dist. 1983). In In Re Marriage of Lorenz, the 
court held that a husband's term life insurance policies were not 
community assets subject to division upon dissolution, since the 
policies had no monetary value. 
In the dissolution proceeding, the trial court determined 
that the husband's two life insurance policies had no cash value. 
Both policies were term policies having a face value of $10,000 
each. One policy was a Veterans Administration policy and the 
other was issued through the husband's employer. The husband 
was the named insured in both policies. The wife appealed, urg-
ing that term insurance policies on the husband's life were a 
community asset. 
Courts have generally recognized the value of whole life in-
surance as its cash surrender value, and have divided that value 
when the policy is determined to be community property.30 Prior 
to In re Marriage of Lorenz, however, no California cases had 
addressed the divisibility of term life insurance policies, which 
are generally accepted as having no value.31 
In formulating its holding, the court analyzed and con-
trasted conflicting California court of appeal cases. In Biltoft v. 
Wootten,32 the court held that the proceeds of a term life insur-
ance policy must be apportioned between community property 
and separate property in the same ratio as the amount paid for 
the premiums from community earnings bore to the amount 
from separate property. Biltoft involved a contest between the 
former wife and the daughter-beneficiary of the decedent over 
the proceeds of the policy acquired during marriage. The mar-
riage had since been dissolved, but the court of appeal based its 
30. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Holmgren, 60 Cal. App. 3d 869, 130 Cal. Rptr. 440 
(1976). 
31. Whole life insurance differs from term life insurance both in value and benefits. 
For instance, term life insurance has no cash surrender value and generally furnishes 
protection for only a specified or limited period of time. Also, the premium for whole life 
insurance remains the same throughout the life of the policyholder, whereas the pre-
mium for term insurance increases with the age of the insured. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
723-24 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
32. 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1979). 
11
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characterization of the policy proceeds on the marital status of 
the insured at the time the insurance was acquired and on the 
fact that community funds were used to purchase the policies. 
Todd u. Todd sS and In Re Marriage of AufmuthS4 estab-
lished that some property rights, such as education, are intangi-
ble and incapable of monetary valuation for division between 
spouses in divorce proceedings. On the other hand, the Lorenz 
court recognized that some intangibles, such as contingent re-
tirement benefits and non-vested pension rights, have been held 
to be divisible property under community property statutes.311 
The Lorenz court cited Todd for the proposition that an as-
set, in order to be divided within the meaning of community 
property laws, must be "of such a character that a monetary 
value can be placed upon it. "36 The court concluded that the 
term insurance policies are not convertible into cash, that no 
monetary value can be placed upon them, and that the assets 
are therefore not divisible on dissolution of the marriage. 
With little discussion, the Lorenz court distinguished 
Biltoft, stating: "The proceeds or benefits of the policy of 
course, have a value. However, until those benefits are payable, 
the policy is worthless. "37 The court therefore concluded that 
the trial court had properly ruled that the term life insurance 
policies were not community property subject to division on dis-
solution of ~arriage. 
The court in Lorenz took an analytical approach that fails 
to recognize or preserve any prospective community interest in 
term life insurance benefits, or to acknowledge that such bene-
fits may have had their origin in community funds. The distinc-
tions between policy proceeds and the policy itself, and between 
term and whole life benefits, certainly merit more discussion 
than the Lorenz court afforded them. Indeed, the court managed 
33. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). 
34. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). 
35. Lorenz, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 467, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 469, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. 
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to avoid any mention of the suggestions made in Biltoft for pro-
tecting the uninsured spouse's community property interest in 
term insurance. The Biltoft court suggested that courts retain 
jurisdiction until the policy owner dies or value the community 
interest in the same manner as other intangible community 
property rights are valued. Clearly, term insurance is unique. 
However, it does not follow that the community interest in the 
proceeds of such a policy should not be protected, when it is 
clear that the policy will render proceeds at some future point. 
B. CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
1. "Foster home" includes care in home of relative for 
purpose of parental rights termination action. 
In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 662 P.2d 922, 191 Cal. Rptr. 
464 (1983). In In re Laura F., the California Supreme Court held 
that in a parental rights termination action, "foster home" 
within the meaning of Civil Code section 232(a)(7),38 includes 
care in the home of a relative. The court also upheld the trial 
court's finding that the mother, who contested the action, had 
not shown that she could provide an adequate home or maintain 
an adequate relationship with the children.39 
Three children were removed from their mother's care after 
a series of investigations for neglect.40 Following dependency 
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (Deering 1982 and Supp. 1984). Originally, this sec-
tion provided for a termination action to be initiated only after a child had been cared 
for in a foster home for at least two consecutive years. An amendment to section 
232(a)(7) reduced the requisite foster home period to one year. In addition, section 
232(a)(7) requires that it be shown by clear and convincing evidence that return of the 
child to the parent would be detrimental to the child and that during the required foster 
care period, the parents have failed or are likely to fail in the future to maintain an 
adequate parental relationship with the child. Since the Laura F. decision, section 
232(a)(7) has been amended. The legislature replaced "foster homes" with "out-of-home 
placement." This change represents legislative approval of that portion of Laura F. that 
included the home of a relative within the meaning of "foster home." CAL. CIY. CODE § 
232(a)(7) (Deering Supp. 1984)(amending CAL. CIY. CODE § 232(a)(7) (1983». 
39. The court also upheld the trial court's determination that the mother had been 
offered adequate opportunities for rehabilitation, a necessary prerequisite to regaining 
custody; that the appropriate standard of proof in section 232 proceedings is clear and 
convincing evidence; and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in failing to 
appoint separate counsel for the children. 
40. In her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bird pointed out that the mother at first 
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proceedings,41 the oldest son was placed with his paternal aunt 
and uncle and his two younger stepsisters were placed in foster 
homes with nonrelatives. Three years later, the state initiated 
proceedings to terminate parental rights.42 At this time, the aunt 
and uncle were willing to adopt the boy but the two sisters had 
no prospects for adoption. The trial court terminated the 
mother's custody and control over all three children. On appeal, 
the mother argued as to the boy that "foster home" within the 
meaning of section 232(a)(7) does not include care in the home 
of a relative, and that as to all three children, the evidence did 
not support the court's decision to terminate her parental rights. 
Civil Code section 232 prescribes the conditions which must 
be met in order for a court to terminate parental custody and 
contro1.43 It seeks to provide a mechanism for termination of pa-
rental rights where there is a realistic possibility that a child will 
be adopted thereafter. In particular, subdivision (a)(7) provides 
that a child must be cared for in a foster home for two or more 
consecutive years before termination of parental rights may be 
sought.44 The mother argued that the termination proceedings 
did not comply with the threshold requirement with regard to 
the boy because he had been living with relatives and not in a 
foster home during the requisite two year period. 
In support of her position, the mother cited In re Antonio 
F.,46 a section 232(a)(7) termination action, as "the first [Califor-
nia] case to define 'foster home' as care other than in the home 
of a parent or relative."46 The Antonio F. court took its defini-
voluntarily assented to foster care for her children due to emotional and financial diffi-
culties that she was experiencing. Although she was investigated by the Department of 
Social Services pursuant to accusations of neglect, no formal allegations by the Depart-
ment were ever made in the original removal of the children from the mother's home. In 
re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 841·42, 662 P.2d 922, 923-24, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 474-75 
(1983). 
41. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3OO(a) (Deering Supp. 1984). 
42. The proceedings were initiated under CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (Deering 1982 
and Supp. 1984). 
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
44. This statutory period has been reduced to one year. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) 
(Deering Supp. 1984) (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (1982». 
45. 78 Cal. App. 3d 440, 144 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978). 
46. Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d at 830, 662 P.2d at 924, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 466 (1983) quoting 
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tion from a relevant section of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code47 which excluded children living with relatives from its 
definition of "foster home."48 The United States Supreme Court 
discredited the Antonio F. definition in Miller v. Youakin. 49 In 
Miller, the Court held that it is unreasonable to differentiate be-
tween children who are equally neglected and abused because of 
the status of their court-appointed substitute parent.IIO The Cali-
fornia Legislature subsequently repealed the Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code to reflect the ruling of the Court. III Therefore, the 
Laura F. court rejected the Antonio F. definition, stating that 
not only was it based on an incorrect construction of the Code, 
but that it also precluded the immediate adoptability of children 
who had been placed with relatives during the statutory two 
year period and, as such, was inconsistent with the purpose of 
Civil Code section 232. 
In addition to requiring a child to have resided in a foster 
home for at least two years prior to commencement of a termi~, 
nation action, section 232(a)(7) mandates a showing that a par-
ent failed during that two year period, and is likely to fail in the 
future, to provide the child with an adequate parental relation-
ship. In In re Carmaleta B.,1I2 the California Supreme Court in-
terpreted this portion of section (a)(7) as requiring courts to bal-
ance the child's interest in secure parenting against the joint 
interests of both parent and child in preserving the family bond. 
The Carma leta B. court held that this balancing test, along with 
an evaluation of parental progress during the two year period in 
which the children are away, represents an appropriate measure 
of future ability to parent successfully. 
Having repeated this criterion, the Laura F. court instead 
focused on the mother's past record as a parent prior to the two 
In re Antonio F., 78 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (1978». 
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11251 (Deering 1979) (repealed 1980). 
48. Section 11251 specifically excluded children living with relatives from its defini-
tion of "foster home" because, under a related federal aid program, foster children who 
were on the Aid to Families With Dependent Children Program (AFDC) were allowed 
greater benefits than non-foster children on AFDC. Therefore, to exclude the home of a 
relative from its definition of "foster home" effectively saved the state money. Id. 
49. 440 U.S. 125 (1979). 
50. Id. at 145. 
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11251 (Deering 1979) (repealed 1980). 
52. 21 Cal. 3d at 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978). 
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year separation period. Holding that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the termination order as to all three children, the 
Laura F. court stated that the mother's past record was the only 
accurate indication of her ability to be a good parent in the fu-
ture. This decision does not represent an application of the 
Carmaleta B. court's balancing test, nor does it take into consid-
eration any progress the mother might have made during the 
two year rehabilitation period. This approach renders the statu-
tory rehabilitation period meaningless. A balancing approach, 
along with a focus on future parenting ability, seems to foster 
the child's best interest. This is because it provides more oppor-
tunity for a parent to show that he or she has in fact improved 
his or her ability to provide a nurturing atmosphere for the 
child. Whenever family ties can be preserved without threaten-
ing the child's well being it is preferable for all concerned. 
Three justices dissented from that portion of the majority 
opinion which found it appropriate to terminate the mother's 
parental rights as to her two daughters. The dissent stated that 
such action was contradictory to the legislative purpose in enact-
ing Civil Code section 232 which is "to serve the welfare and 
best interest of a child by providing the stability and security of 
an adoptive home when those conditions are otherwise missing 
from his or her life."1i3 The dissent pointed out that while the 
boy had clear and immediate prospects for adoption, the two 
girls had no such opportunities. Also, the fact that the girls suf-
fered from physical and developmental disabilities made their 
prospects for future adoption very bleak. Therefore, the dissent 
found that it was not in the daughters' best interests to sever 
the maternal relationship when no better relationship with 
which to replace it was in existence and continuing the relation-
ship was not detrimental to the girls' well-being. 
In the absence of a showing that the mother had abused, 
neglected, or molested her children, it is not clear what past 
parenting record the court relied on in determining that the 
mother had no future ability to be an adequate parent. The 
court's decision seems to indicate that when a child is placed in 
53. 33 Cal. 3d at 845, 662 P.2d at 935, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (1983). 
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a foster home, this is prima facie evidence of past bad parenting. 
In addition, Laura F. represents a total disregard for the 
Carmaleta balancing test and seems to focus solely on past pa-
rental behavior as evidenced by a need for foster care. 
2. Mediator of child custody or visitation disputes may be 
cross-examined upon rendering recommendation to court. 
McLaughlin v. Superior Ct., 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 479 (1st Dist. 1983). In McLaughlin v. Superior Ct., the 
court held that a mediator of child custody and visitation dis-
putes in a marriage dissolution proceeding could not render a 
recommendation to a court unless a protective order was issued 
which guaranteed the parties the right to cross-examine the me-
diator concerning the recommendation. The court concluded 
that a policy which allowed a court to receive a recommendation 
from a mediator, but denied the parties the right to cross-ex-
amine the mediator, was a denial of due process and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The couple in McLaughlin married in 1969 and agreed to 
dissolve their marriage in 1982. When a dispute arose regarding 
the custody of the parties' children, the dispute was referred for 
mediation, pursuant to California Civil Code section 4607(a).54 
The husband moved for a protective order. He contended that 
the mediation should proceed, but requested that if no agree-
ment was reached, the mediator should be prohibited from mak-
ing a recommendation to the court unless the husband was guar-
anteed the right to cross-examine the mediator. The trial court 
denied the motion on the ground that the protective order re-
quested would violate a policy adopted by the court pursuant to 
Civil Code section 4607(e), which states in relevant part: "The 
mediator may, consistent with local court rules, render a recom-
mendation to the court as to the custody or visitation of the. 
children. "66 
The trial court had adopted a local policy which required 
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (Deering Supp. 1984). Section 4607(a) states "[w)here 
it appears ... [that) ... the custody or visitation of ... children ... [is) contested 
... the matter shall be set for mediation . . . ." . 
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(e) (Deering Supp. 1984). 
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that a mediator make a recommendation to the court if the par-
ties fail to agree on issues of child custody or visitation. The pol-
icy also required that the mediator not state his or her reasons 
for the recommendation. In accordance with its own policy, the 
trial court denied the parties the right to cross-examine the me-
diator on the ground that the reasons had not even been dis-
closed to the court. According to the trial court, these require-
ments are consistent with Civil Code section 4607(c) which 
states that the mediatjon proceedings "shall be confidential."116 
The court of appeal recognized that section 4607(e) does not 
require or authorize cross-examination of the mediator by the 
parties. However, the court concluded that a policy which per-
mits a court to receive a significant recommendation on con-
tested issues but denies the parties the right to cross-examine 
cannot constitutionally be upheld. In coming to this conclusion, 
the court of appeal cited Fewel v. Fewel,1I7 where the court held 
it reversible error if an investigator did not appear like any other 
witness and testify subject to the rules of evidence and the right 
of cross-examination. The court of appeal also relied on Long v. 
Long,1I8 a case with facts similar to those in McLaughlin, which 
cited Fewel as authority for the proposition that it is a denial of 
due process to deny a litigant the right to cross-examine a wit-
ness who testifies against him or her. 
The court in McLaughlin found these holdings applicable 
and therefore construed the permissive language of Civil Code 
section 4607(e) in a manner consistent with the due process re-
quirements discussed in Fewel and Long. The court held that a 
mediator may not make a recommendation to a court in the ab-
sence of a protective order guaranteeing the right to cross-ex-
amine the mediator, unless the right has been waived. 
By upholding the right to cross-examine the mediator, the 
decision is constitutionally sound because it guarantees the par-
ties due process in courts which choose to receive recommenda-
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(c) (Deering Supp. 1984). 
57. 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943). 
58. 251. Cal. App. 2d 732, 736, 59 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1967). 
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tions from mediators. 
However, if cross-examination of a mediator is mandated 
under due process, it follows that a mediator cannot make a rec-
ommendation to a court without in effect agreeing to violate the 
confidentiality requirement of Civil Code section 4607(c). A me-
diation proceeding can only work when both parties are assured 
that the mediator will not later turn against them. If 11 mediator 
wishes to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation proceed-
ings, helshe must refuse to make a recommendation to the court. 
This may result in a decision which is not in the child's best 
interest. The mediator, a skilled professional, is caught in a 
double bind because helshe can no longer recommend what hel 
she feels is best for the child without violating the trust and in-
tegrity that is the basis of the mediation proceeding. 
3. Non-custodial parent may expose children to own reli-
gious practices absent clear evidence of harm to children. 
In re Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1st 
Dist. 1983). In In re Mentry, the court of appeal reversed a trial 
court ruling enjoining a non-custodial parent from exposing his 
children to his religious practices during their visits with him. 
The court ruled that the injunction could not be upheld absent a 
clear affirmative showing of harm or likelihood of harm to the 
children. 
The mother and custodial parent sought to enjoin the non-
custodial father from exposing their children to any religious 
views not sanctioned by the mother. Although both parents had 
been of the same faith during the marriage, the mother had 
since changed her religious views. The mother contended that 
exposing the children to two conflicting religious doctrines would 
confuse them and ultimately harm them. The trial court agreed, 
granted the restraining order, and the father appealed. 
The father based his argument on the fact that there was no 
harm to the children. He cited In re Murga69 in which a di-
vorced mother asserted that "as the custodial parent, she [had] 
59. 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1980). 
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an absolute right to direct the child's religious upbringing."60 
The Murga court, however, held that "a court will not enjoin the 
non-custodial parent from discussing religion with the child or 
involving the child in his or her religious activities in the ab-
sence of a showing that the child will be thereby harmed."61 
However, the Murga court, deciding the case on its facts, failed 
to state a test for when such a showing of harm has been made. 
Quoting the Massachusetts case Felton u. Felton,62 the 
Mentry court stated, "harm to the child from conflicting reli-
gious instructions or practices ... should not be simply as-
sumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail."63 In 
Mentry, the evidence of harm consisted of testimony by the 
mother that one child was having social adjustment problems, 
and testimony by a court conciliator predicting future harm to 
the children. Rejecting the evidence as "manifestly insufficient," 
the court pointed out that the mother had failed to establish a 
correlation between the children's social adjustment problems 
and the father's religious practices. The court characterized the 
conciliator's testimony as "speculative" in light of the fact that 
he had never interviewed the children. 
The Mentry court, while reaffirming the Murga rule, did not 
articulate any guidelines for when a showing of likelihood of 
harm has been made. While it is clear that a showing of actual 
harm will satisfy the rule, it is not so clear how close to actual 
harm one must come before the court will be inclined to inter-
vene. It seems that the court requires a showing of likelihood of 
harm that approaches that end of the spectrum closest to actual 
harm before it is likely to intrude into the privacy of the 
family.64 
60. [d. at 504, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 81. 
61. [d. at 505, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 82. 
62. 418 N.E. 2d 606 (1981). 
63. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (1983). 
64. The Mentry court articulated policy considerations that it finds implicit in the 
Murga rule. One consideration is a judicial disinclination to intervene in the family home 
absent compelling reasons. The court also favors an approach that seeks to preserve pa-
rental autonomy and family harmony. The Mentry court stated that these policies are to 
be particularly stressed in litigation surrounding marital dissolution. The reason for this 
emphasis is a desire to maintain whatever family ties are left after the breakdown of the 
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C. SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Failure of one spouse to disclose existence of commu-
nity asset to other spouse is extrinsic fraud for purpose of set-
ting aside final divorce decree. 
In re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal.3d 897, 663 P.2d 187, 191 
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1983). In In re Marriage of Modnick, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the failure of one spouse to dis-
close the existence of a community asset to the other constitutes 
extrinsic fraud. Because such fraudulent conduct deprived the 
complaining spouse of the full opportunity to present her case, 
the court found that she was entitled to equitable relief and set 
aside the property and spousal support provisions of a final di-
vorce decree.61i 
The couple obtained an interlocutory judgment of marital 
dissolution which awarded the wife spousal support and divided 
community assets. Thereafter, it was revealed that the husband 
had concealed funds belonging to the community.66 The hus-
band agreed to resolve the dispute with the wife over the newly 
exposed assets privately. He then requested and obtained a final 
judgment which bound the parties to the interlocutory provi-
sions. Relying on their agreement, the wife attempted to negoti-
ate a fair settlement with the husband. Failing in her attempt, 
the wife moved to have the interlocutory and final decrees set 
aside alleging fraud. The trial court denied her motion and she 
appealed. 
In Orlando v. Orlando,67 during property settlement pro-
ceedings, a husband not only failed to disclose the existence of 
community assets, but also took deliberate steps to conceal 
family unit as a single entity. 
65. The court also held that the wife's claim was not barred by laches because she 
had been reasonably diligent in seeking relief and her delay resulted in little, if any, 
prejudice to the husband. In addition, the court found that the wife had failed to estab-
lish that she and her husband had reconciled during the interlocutory period. 
66. The concealment was exposed during an investigation into the husband's 
finances by the Internal Revenue Service. The investigation revealed unreported savings 
accounts, some of which contained monies earned by the husband during the marriage. 
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the husband, in an effort to conceal the ac-
counts, had transferred ownership of them to two relatives. 
67. 243 Cal. App. 2d 248, 52 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1966). 
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them. The court allowed the final judgment of divorce to be re-
opened stating: "[a] party may attack a judgment on the ground 
of extrinsic fraud when the conduct of the other party has de-
prived him of an opportunity to present his claim or defense or 
to obtain a fair adversary hearing."68 
In Kulchar v. Kulchar,69 the supreme court reaffirmed the 
position taken by the Orlando court, gave examples of situations 
which constitute extrinsic fraud, and distinguished them from 
those situations which constitute intrinsic fraud. Where there 
has been a false promise of a compromise or where one party has 
been kept in ignorance of the acts of the other, such circum-
stances give rise to a claim of extrinsic fraud, and entitle the 
wronged party to a new and fair hearing.70 However, relief is de-
nied where the fraud is intrinsic; that is, where a party could 
have and should have guarded against fraud at the prior hear-
ing.71 In cases of extrinsic fraud, the duty of full disclosure arises 
out of the fiduciary relationship which exists between husband 
and wife.72 The Modnick court indicated that fiduciary responsi-
bilities inherent in the spousal relationship are ongoing and ter-
minate only when the court has divided the community property 
and the marriage is dissolved. 
In Modnick, the husband violated his fiduciary duty to the 
wife. He did so by failing to disclose and deliberately attempting 
to hide community assets from her. The wife had no knowledge 
of, nor did she have reason to have knowledge of, the hidden 
assets. Therefore, the Modnick court held such actions by the 
husband to be extrinsic fraud, the presence of which prevented 
the wife from receiving her equitable share of the community 
assets and a fair assessment of her spousal support rights. Thus, 
the court upheld the wife's motion to vacate the interlocutory 
and final judgment of dissolution. In so doing, the Modnick 
court followed established California precedent. Moreover, the 
court's decision is consistent with the underlying policy of the 
68. [d. at 251, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
69. 1 Cal. 3d 467, 462 P.2d 17,82 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1969). 
70. [d. at 471, 462 P.2d at 19, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
71. [d. at 472, 462 P.2d at 20, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 492. 
72. [d. at 474, 462 P.2d at 21, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
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California community property scheme; that is, to divide equally 
all community assets when a marriage is dissolved and to award 
spousal support according to need and honest ability to pay. 
2. Civil Code section 5127.6 construed to apply only to 
custodial parents receiving AFDC and as so construed, held 
constitutional. 
In re Marriage of Shupe, 139 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 288 (4th Dist. 1983). In In re Marriage of Shupe, the court 
addressed the constitutionality of California Civil Code section 
5127.6, which creates a presumption that the income of a custo-
dial parent's spouse is available for the support of the custodial 
parent's child. The court construed section 5127.6 to apply only 
to custodial families who have applied for or are receiving AFDC 
benefits and as so construed, upheld its constitutionality. 
Upon dissolution, a wife was awarded custody of the parties' 
child and her husband was ordered to pay child support. Years 
later, she filed an action for increased support payments based 
on the increased age of their child and on inflation. In the 
meantime, wife had remarried and she and her new husband had 
entered into an agreement to hold their earnings as separate 
rather than as community property. At the hearing on increasing 
his support payments, husband sought to have wife's new hus-
band's income records entered into evidence. She objected on 
the ground that under their agreement, her new husband's in-
come was his separate property and not available for the child's 
support. Husband contended that Civil Code section 5127.673 
created a presumption that all income which, in absence of a 
contract between wife and her husband would be community 
property, was available to support the child. The trial court re-
fused to admit the evidence and ordered an increase in support. 
Husband appealed. 
California Civil Code section 5127.674 reads in part: "the 
community property interest of a natural or adoptive parent in 
the income of his or her spouse shall be considered uncondition-
ally available for the care and support of any child who resides 
73. CAL. CIY. CODE § 5127.6 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
74. [d. 
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with the child's natural or adoptive parent who is married to 
such spouse." That section was enacted as part of the Welfare 
Reform Act of 197976 for the purpose of presuming the availabil-
ity of stepparent income in determining eligibility for AFDC 
benefits.76 However, section 5127.6 was not limited to AFDC 
families because a federal regulation required that, in order for 
it to create a presumption of the availability of stepparent in-
come in AFDC determinations, the section must impose a duty 
on all stepparents generally to support their stepchildren.77 
Husband in Shupe contended that section 5127.6 invali-
dated:wife's contract with her new husband insofar as the con-
tract removed the new husband's income from availability for 
supporting the child. Wife contended that such an interpreta-
tion violated her right to equal protection of the laws because it 
guaranteed the availability of the custodial parent's community 
property while Civil Code section 1997s immunizes the commu-
nity property in the non-custodial parent. Civil Code section 199 
provides that under the Civil Code, Title 2, Chapter 1,79 the ob-
ligations of parents to support their children may be satisfied 
only from the parents' total earnings, assets acquired therefrom, 
or separate property. In In re Marriage of Brown,so the court 
held that section 199 did not conflict with or supersede Civil 
Code sections in other chapters which subjected community 
property to liability for child supportS1 and subjected a wife's 
75. 1979 Cal. Stat. 4561. 
76. SEN. COMM. ON HEALTH AND WELFARE. Staff Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 381 
(1979). 
77. 45 C.F.R. § 233-90 (1983). 
The duty of stepparents to make their income available for the support of 
nonadopted stepchildren has been subject to judicial review: CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.6 has 
been held not to accomplish its goal of imposing such a duty on all stepparents. Wood v. 
Woods, 133 Cal. App. 3d 954, 184 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1982). However, by federal statute, 
states are now mandated to include stepparent income in AFDC eligibility determina-
tions. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(31)(1983). 
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
79. Id. "[I)ncluding but not limited to §§ 196 and 206 ... " (Deering Supp. 1984). 
80. In Re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1979). 
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4807 (Deering 1972). Section 4807 reads: "[t)he community 
property, the quasi-community property and the separate property may be subjected to 
the support, maintenance, and education of the children in such proportions as the court 
deems just." 
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interest in the community property of her marriage to liability 
for child support.82 Therefore, the court rejected wife's equal 
protection argument. 
However, the Shupe court held that section 5127.6, as con-
strued by husband violated wife's equal protection in another 
way. The court could find no rational basis for distinguishing 
between custodial and non-custodial parents generally for pur-
poses of presuming availability of their community property in-
terests.83 Thus, if construed to apply to all custodial parents, the 
statute could not be upheld. 
Instead of invalidating the statute, however, the court con-
strued it to apply· only to custodial parents who had applied for 
or were receiving AFDC. The court held that, as so construed, 
section 5127.6 had a rational relationship with the legitimate 
government interest of facilitating the administration of govern-
ment funds. Under section 5127.6, the state would be saved the 
inconvenience and expense of monitoring the incomes of non-
custodial families, and could deal only with those families di-
rectly receiving the AFDC funds. Thus, the court held that sec-
tion 5127.6 did not violate equal protection as so construed. The 
court upheld the judgment below awarding increased support 
payments because the wife was not an AFDC recipient or 
applicant. 
The court in Shupe, by narrowly construing section 5127.6, 
effectively avoided the question whether that section invalidates 
a pre-marital agreement between a child's parent and stepparent 
to keep their incomes as separate property. That question seems 
to be moot, however, in light of the new federal statute84 which 
requires inclusion of stepparent income in AFDC determina-
tions. Thus, such an agreement between an AFDC parent and 
his or her spouse would presumably be invalid insofar as it lim-
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1972). Section 5127.5 reads in pertinent part: 
"The wife's interest in the community property, including the earnings of her husband, 
is liable for the support of her children .... " 
83. The court relied on Civil Code section 196, CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (Deering 1984), 
which imposes equal responsibility on each parent for supporting their child, and Civil 
Code section 246, CAL. CIV. CODE § 246 (Deering Supp. 1984), which it held to require 
consideration of a parent's community property interest in his or her spouse's income in 
determining child support obligations. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(31)(1983). 
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ited availability of the stepparent's income to support the child. 
D. HEALTH AND WELFARE 
1. Probate court lacks jurisdiction to order sterilization of 
conservatee. 
Conservatorship of Valerie N., 152 Cal. App. 3d 224, 199 
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1st Dist. 1983). In Conservatorship of Valerie N., 
the court of appeal followed Guardianship of Kemp8r. and 
Guardianship of Tulley86 and held that a probate court lacks 
both statutory authorization and equity jurisdiction to order 
sterilization of any person who is under probate conservatorship. 
The court also held constitutional Probate Code section 
2356(d),87 effective January 1, 1981, which prohibits sterilization 
of conservatees under probate jurisdiction. 
The natural mother and stepfather of a severely retarded 25 
year old woman petitioned the superior court, sitting in probate, 
for appointment as her conservators and for authorization to 
have her sterilized. The probate court granted the petitioner's 
appointment as co-conservators of their daughter's person but 
denied their application for authority to have her sterilized. The 
court relied upon Probate Code section 2356(d) in its order de-
nying petitioners' application although that statute was not yet 
effective. Petitioners appealed, challenging the constitutionality 
of the statute. 
Probate Code section 2356(d) provides that "[n]o ward or 
conservatee may be sterilized under the provisions of this divi-
sion. "88 This statute was not operative at any time during the 
probate court proceedings nor at the time of the order denying 
the petitioners' application. Therefore, the constitutional issues 
raised on appeal were moot.89 The court of appeal affirmed the 
85. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974). 
86. 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978). 
87. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 1981). 
88. [d. 
89. However, the court discussed the constitutional issues despite their mootness in 
WOMEN'S LAW FORUM 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 16
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss3/16
1984] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 811 
probate court's order on the basis of Kemp and Tulley. 
Both Kemp and Tulley presented issues identical to that in 
the present case. The Kemp court noted that a probate court 
has exclusive jurisdiction in guardianship proceedings, and once 
a guardian is appointed, the court maintains jurisdiction over 
the guardian and the administration of the ward's affairs. The 
court pointed out that California superior courts exercise pro-
bate jurisdiction under constitutional authorization, but that a 
probate court's powers and procedures are limited and defined 
by statute. The Kemp court found no statute which conferred 
upon the probate court the authority to order involuntary steril-
ization on conservatees under its administration, nor was there 
any case law in California to support that extension of its 
authority. 
In Tulley, the guardian of a mentally incompetent ward ar-
gued on appeal that the superior court proceeded as a court of 
general jurisdiction and therefore possessed "inherent and un-
fettered equity power to serve and promote the interest and wel-
fare of the incompetent" including authorizing sterilization 
"which was manifestly in the best interest of the ward. "90 The 
court rejected this argument on the basis of Kemp and further 
reasoned that sterilization "irreversibly denies a human being 
the fundamental right to bear and beget a child. "91 Accordingly, 
the court followed established precedent in holding that power 
to grant such an extreme remedy may not be inferred from gen-
eral principles of equity jurisdiction derived at common law, but 
must come from specific legislative authorization.92 
The court in Valerie N. followed Kemp and Tulley and re-
jected the petitioner's contentions that probate courts have ju-
risdiction to order an involuntary sterilization. The court also 
reached the constitutionality of Probate Code section 2356(d) 
even though that issue was moot in the present case. The court 
noted that it was appropriate to "resolve a moot point if it in-
the instant case. 
90. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 270. 
91. 1d. at 701, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 268. 
92. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1977) rev'd on other 
grounds, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671, 674 (S.D. Ohio 
1971). 
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volves 'an issue of continuing public interest that is likely to re-
cur in other cases' " and when such resolution would be "likely 
to affect the future rights of the parties before [the court]."93 
Petitioners' appeal challenged the statute's constitutionality 
on three grounds: 1) the statute denies a conservatee's right to 
privacy; 2) the statute denies due process of law; and 3) the stat-
ute denies equal protection of the laws. The parents argued that 
Probate Code section 2356(d) denied their mentally incompetent 
daughter the fundamental right to choose whether or not to bear 
a child, which is a right of privacy guaranteed under the United 
States and California Constitutions, and protected by due pro-
cess of law. Only a compelling state interest may limit the exer-
cise of that right. 
The court rejected both the right to privacy and due process 
arguments on the same grounds. It reasoned that a competent 
person's right to choose voluntary sterilization could not be 
equated with the compelled sterilization of a mentally incompe-
tent person. The court found that the state has a compelling in-
terest in protecting mentally incompetent persons from the 
abuses of forced sterilization. The parent's inconvenience in car-
ing for their child and their fears of an undesirable pregnancy 
were inadequate justification for such an extreme and irreversi-
ble remedy. Thus, the court found that the statute was neces-
sary to the permissible legislative goal of protecting an incompe-
tent person's right to procreate. 
The court also rejected petitioners' equal protection argu-
ment. The petitioners argued that the statute unreasonably de-
prives incompetent persons of the right to choose sterilization on 
the same terms afforded to competent persons. The court found 
that the statute's differentiation between competent and incom-
petent persons was not an unreasonable classification. The stat-
ute distinguishes between these two groups on the basis of 
whether the person knowingly chooses sterilization with full un-
derstanding of the finality of its consequences. The respondent 
93. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 674, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 287. The court did not explain how 
these requirementa were met in this case. 
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in this case was afflicted with Down's Syndrome and had an IQ 
of 30. The court found that the respondent was not capable of 
knowing and voluntary consent to a sterilization procedure, and 
the statute prohibits anyone from exercising that consent for 
her. Because the statute protects the fundamental right of an 
incompetent person to bear children, the court held that it with-
stands strict scrutiny and does not violate equal protection. 
In a lengthy dissent, Associate· Justice Sims disagreed with 
the majority's conclusions both as to the court's jurisdiction to 
authorize sterilization and as to the constitutionality of section 
3256(d). The dissent cited Committee to Defend Reproductive 
Rights v. Myers,94 which struck down Budget Act provisions 
which limited Medi-Cal funding for abortions. The Myers Court 
stated, "[w]hen the state finances the costs of childbirth, but not 
the termination of pregnancy, it realistically forces an indigent 
pregnant woman to choose childbirth, even though she has the 
constitutional right to refuse to do SO."91\ Analogizing to Myers, 
the dissent reasoned that the majority's opinion denied the "in-
competent a forum in which to determine whether [her] mental 
and physical health and best interests [would] be served by ster-
ilization. . . "96 thus forcing her into a choice either to withdraw 
from association with men or bear the risk of pregnancy.97 Es-
sentially, the dissent concluded that the court could not avoid 
making a choice for the incompetent person, and that the result 
of the majority's approach was to make an automatic choice in 
favor of bearing children. 
Instead of attempting to protect her right not to have such 
a choice made for her, the dissent would hold that an incompe-
tent woman has a constitutional right "to have 'freedom of 
choice' exercised on her ... behalf through substituted judg-
94. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). 
95. Id. at 285, 625 P.2d at 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886. 
96. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 241, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 489. 
97. The dissent also relied on authority from other jurisdictions which equates the 
right to sterilization with the right to abortion. See, In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 
1981); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (Conn. 1978). In addition, it relied on In re 
Brady, 426 A.2d 467, 473-75 (N.J. 1981), which held that: "The right to choose among 
procreation, sterilization and other methods of contraception is an important privacy 
right of all individuals. . . . Where an incompetent person lacks the mental capacity to 
make that choice, a court should ensure the exercise of that right on behalf of the incom-
petent in a manner that reflects his or her best interests." 426 A.2d at 475. 
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ment of a court of record predicated upon the best interests of 
[her] mental and physical health .... "98 The dissent would, 
however, grant sterilization authorization only after both a full 
judicial hearing with notice to relatives and interested parties, 
and a comprehensive medical, psychological, and social evalua-
tion of the incompetent person. Further, it would only authorize 
sterilization where the following facts were established by clear 
and convincing evidence: 1) that the conservatee was legally in-
competent to make the sterilization decision herself; 2) that she 
had not expressly objected to the operation; 3) that she was in-
capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings; 4) that 
she was incapable of understanding the nature of the sexual 
function, reproduction, and sterilization; 5) that her incapacity 
is likely to be permanent; 6) that she is capable of reproduction; 
7) that she is permanently incapable of parenting a child, even 
with reasonable assistance; 8) that the avoidance of pregnancy or 
procreation is necessary for her mental or physical health and 
well being; 9) that less intensive and permanent contraceptive 
methods are unworkable, inapplicable, or contraindicated; 10) 
that the proposed operation is the least restrictive alternative; 
and 11) that the operation will not be harmful. 
In keeping with its approach to the jurisdictional question, 
the dissent would also hold Probate Code section 2356(d) uncon-
stitutional insofar as it denies "an unreasoning mentally re-
tarded incompetent the right to have a substituted choice made 
on her behalf. "99 
Formerly, Welfare and Institutions Code section 7254100 
permitted forced sterilization upon persons institutionalized in 
state hospitals under carefully prescribed statutory limitations. 
The California legislature repealed this statute simultaneously 
with enacting Probate Code section 2356(d).101 These two ac-
98. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 245, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 492. 
99. Id. at 254, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99. 
100. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254 (Deering 1979), repealed by Act of Sept. 18, 
1979, ch. 730, § 156.5, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2540. . 
101. Stats. 1979, ch. 726, § 3.Q1 codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d). The Law 
Revision Commission's commentary to that statute notes that section 2356(d) is consis-
tent with the holdings in Kemp and Tulley. 15 CALIF. L. REV. COM. REP. 451, 700, (1980). 
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tions by the legislature demonstrate the state's recognition of 
the potential abuses of involuntary sterilization, even when the 
procedure is statutorily controlled, and indicate the legislature's 
unwillingness to sanction and participate in the forced steriliza-
tion of mentally retarded people. The strong opinion and dissent 
in Valerie N. accentuate the ethical dilemmas which arise when 
society attempts to protect the fundamental rights of people it 
has determined are unable to exercise these rights for 
themselves. 
E. NON-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Implied contract between unmarried partners LS en-
forceable despite subsequent marriage. 
Watkins v. Watkins, 143 Cal. App. 3d 651, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54 
(3rd Dist. 1983). The court of appeal in Watkins v. Watkins 
held that an implied contract between unmarried partners is en-
forceable despite their subsequent marriage to each other. In ad-
dition, the court held that the rule prohibiting a married couple 
from contracting with respect to domestic services is inapplica-
ble to contracts entered into while the parties are in a 
nonmarital relationship. 
A man and a woman lived together for six years in a non-
marital relationship, during which the woman was the home-
maker. Thereafter, the parties married. One year later the man 
petitioned for a marital dissolution and the woman filed a sepa-
rate action for breach of implied contract. The trial court upheld 
the woman's cause of action and awarded her damages. On ap-
peal, the man maintained that as a matter of law, the woman 
lost her right to enforce the contract when they entered into a 
legal marriage. 
In Marvin v. Marvin,102 the California Supreme Court up-
held a non-marital partner's cause of action for breach of im-
plied contract. It held that "[i]n the absence of an express con-
tract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to 
determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied con-
102. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). 
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tract. . . between the parties. "103 Two policy considerations jus-
tified the result in Marvin: 1) a desire to fulfill the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to a non-marital relationship;104 and 
2) a desire to achieve an equitable distribution of the property 
acquired between the parties during the relationship. 1011 
To extinguish automatically the wife's contract rights upon 
marriage, reasoned the Watkins court, would be incompatible 
with the goals of Marvin. The Watkins court, following Marvin, 
stated that homemaker services are not without value; therefore, 
to deprive the woman of her right to assert her claim would nul-
lify her contribution to the partnership. 1 OS Therefore, the Wat-
kins court found an implied contract existed between the parties 
during their six year relationship preceding marriage. In addi-
tion, those rights were determined to be earned rights and as 
such were not extinguishable despite a subsequent marriage. 
The husband argued that postmarital enforcement of the 
contract was in derogation of the marital relationship. The Wat-
kins court rejected his contention and stated that failing to pre-
serve such rights would in fact discourage marriage because 
those who acquire them will fear forfeiture if they marry. 
The court then discussed and distinguished two cases which 
held certain contracts between married people to be invalid. In 
Estate of Sonnickson,107 a man and a woman entered into a 
written contract while unmarried and not in contemplation of 
marriage. Under the terms of the agreement, the woman was to 
serve as companion to and homemaker for the man for the rest 
of his life in return for a portion of his real and personal prop-
erty when he died. In addition, the woman agreed to give up her 
profession in order to devote herself full time to her commit-
103. [d. at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
104. [d. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 83l. 
105. [d. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. 
106. The Watkins court pointed out that during the six years that the unmarried 
parties lived together, the woman acted as homemaker, cook, nurse, and confidant to the 
man. In addition, she assisted with the rearing of his children. 
107. 23 Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643, (1937). 
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ment under the contract. lOS The couple later married. Upon the 
man's death, the woman sought to enforce the written contract. 
The Sonnicksen court refused to uphold the premarital contract 
and stated that "[w]hen the parties subsequently entered into a 
contract of marriage and became husband and wife, one of the 
implied terms of the contract of marriage was that [she] would 
perform without compensation the services covered by [the] 
written agreement."109 
In Brooks v. Brooks,l1O in consideration for marriage and 
support during the marriage, a woman agreed to provide nursing 
and housekeeping services for a man. Brooks held the contract 
to be void stating the rule "that a married woman cannot con-
tract with her husband with respect to domestic services which 
are incidental to her marital status, since such contracts are 
against public policy."111 
The Watkins court stated that "[i]n both Sonnicksen and 
Brooks, the applicable contracts explicitly provided that the wo-
man necessarily had to provide services during the marriage in 
order to receive the consideration contemplated by the con-
tracts."112 The Watkins court distinguished Sonnicksen and 
Brooks by holding that the contract in the instant case was un-
related to the marital relationship. The woman sought only to 
enforce rights she had gained prior to the marriage. She made 
no contract claim for domestic services rendered for any period 
of time inclusive of the marriage. Therefore, the court held that 
no public policy was compromised and upheld the woman's right 
to enforce the contract. 
The Watkins court upheld the right to imply a contract be-
tween a man and a woman who live together unmarried, as es-
tablished in Marvin. In addition, the validity of such a contraCt 
survives marriage. The Watkins holding is consistent with pub-
108. Prior to and at the time the parties entered into the contract, the woman had 
been engaging in professional nursing work. [d. at 476, 73 P.2d at 644. 
109. Sonnicksen, 23 Cal. App. 2d at 479, 73 P.2d at 645. 
110. 48 Cal. App. 2d 347, 119 P.2d 970 (1941). 
111. [d. at 350, 119 P.2d at 972. 
112. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 56. In Sonnicksen, although the 
contract was premarital, the wife would receive consideration under the contract only 
after providing care and companionship for the remainder of the husband's life, a period 
necessarily including any marriage. 23 Cal. App. 2d at 476, 73 P.2d at 644. 
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lic policies favoring marriage and the equitable distribution of 
property in that it prevents those who would breach Marvin 
contracts by abusing the privilege of marriage from doing so. 
III. TORT LAW 
A. WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS 
1. Privacy rights of institutionalized woman bar her re-
covery for failure to supervise sexual activity; cause of action 
for failure to provide birth control and pre-natal care upheld. 
Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1st 
Dist. 1983). In Foy v. Greenblott, the court of appeal allowed an 
institutionalized, incompetent woman to sue medical care prov-
iders for the wrongful birth of her child. However, although the 
court permitted plaintiff to pursue her cause of action, it se-
verely curtailed her chances of recovery by limiting the scope of 
the duty owed to her by her doctors and by charging her with a 
heavy burden of proof. The court imposed these constraints out 
of a concern for plaintiff's constitutional and statutory rights of 
privacy and reproductive freedom.lI3 
Plaintiff Virgie Foy, a conservatee, was a patient in a pri-
vate, locked, mental facility. Although she had a history of "irre-
sponsible sexual behavior,"114 her contact with males was un-
supervised and she was given no contraceptive counseling, 
113. The court also allowed her action for failure to provide prenatal care. However, 
the court denied her son's cause of action for "wrongful life" in accordance with prior 
California decisions which preclude recovery to an unimpaired child. See Turpin v. Sor-
tini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. 
App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). The action by mother and son for "deprivation of 
a normal parent-child relationship" was denied on the grounds that loss of parental/filial 
consortium is not actionable, especially where it never existed in the first place. See 
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); 
Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). Finally, 
defendant County of Santa Clara, public guardian, was found to be immune under the 
California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 854.8(a)(2) (Deering 1982). 
114. The opinion fails to define "irresponsible sexual behavior." Thus it is unclear 
whether plaintiff did not understand the nature of the activity, was incap~ble of control-
ling her actions, did not comprehend possible consequences, or simply did not conform 
to a societal norm in her behavior. 
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medication, or devices. Her pregnancy was not diagnosed until 
two weeks before delivery and she received no prenatal care. 
The terms of her conservatorship precluded plaintiff from mak-
ing any medical decisions. Plaintiff sued, inter alia, on a theory 
of wrongful birth and the trial court sustained defendants' de-
murrer. Plaintiff appealed. 
Under current California case law, unwanted pregnancy and 
birth is actionable if plaintiff can show that the wrongful birth 
was the proximate result of medical malpractice. This case is 
distinguished from other wrongful birth cases, lUi because due to 
her mental condition plaintiff did not and could not actively 
seek to prevent or terminate her pregnancy. Plaintiff urged that 
the scope of duty owed her by defendants included better super-
vision of her private activities; contraceptive counseling and 
medication; a timely diagnosis of pregnancy; and an opportunity 
to abort. 
Plaintiff theorized that as an incompetent female she should 
under no circumstances have been allowed to bear a child. She 
further argued that the scope of defendants' duty to her in-
cluded the prevention of such an occurrence. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, has held that a woman has a fundamental right 
of privacy in matters of reproductive choice. us Furthermore, 
mental patients and conservatees in this state enjoy "the same 
legal rights ... guaranteed all other persons .... "117 The Cali-
fornia Probate Code specifically prohibits sterilization of men-
tally incompetent persons. U8 Only when a patient's life was in 
danger has a California court set aside this prohibition. us Be-
cause plaintiff made no claim of medical necessity for steriliza-
tion and because reproductive freedom is accorded the highest 
constitutional protection, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that 
115. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (negli-
gently performed tubal ligation); Sills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 
(1976) (unsuccessful abortion). 
116. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1 (Deering Supp. 1984). See also CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 5327 (Deering 1979). 
118. "No ward or conservatee shall be sterilized under the provisions of this divi-
sion." CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (Deering 1981). See also supra notes 85-101 and ac-
companying text. 
119. Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1982) (hys-
terectomy of conservatee authorized on a showing that without the procedure she stood 
an 80% chance of developing cancer). 
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defendants had an absolute duty to prevent the birth of her 
child. 
Similarly, the court held that defendants were not negligent 
in failing to supervise plaintiff's access to males. The degree of 
supervision which would have been required to ensure that 
plaintiff did not conceive would have countermanded Califor-
nia's express policy that institutionalized persons be cared for in 
the least restrictive environment possible and that interference 
with patient's privacy and social interaction be kept to the feasi-
ble minimum.12o The court reasoned: (a) that voluntary sexual 
activity could not be regarded as "an objective harm which the 
patient must be spared";121 and (b) that such potential tort lia-
bility would discourage hospitals from giving patients more than 
minimal freedom. 
The court held that concern for patients' constitutional and 
statutory rights did not dictate dismissal of plaintiff's remaining 
theories. Defendants' failure to provide her with contraceptives 
potentially violated the same right of reproductive choice that 
the court sought to protect in dismissing plaintiff's other claims. 
Furthermore, defendants' failure timely to diagnose plaintiff's 
pregnancy deprived her of both the choice to abort and of neces-
sary prenatal care.122 
However, in order to prevail in her claim, the court held 
that plaintiff must prove that had contraceptive methods been 
available she would have used them and they would have been 
effective. In light of plaintiff's mental condition, it is unlikely 
that she could have profited from counseling or used contracep-
tive methods which would have required her active participa-
tion. Other methods, such as IUD or contraceptive pills, medical 
risks notwithstanding, would have required consent by her con-
servator. It is unlikely that plaintiff's conservator would have 
been willing to second-guess a patient's reproductive choice. 
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(a), (b), (g), § 5358(a), (c) (Deering Supp. 
1984). 
121. 141 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 91. 
122. The court held that even if plaintiff cannot prevail in her action for wrongful 
birth, she may still recover for negligent deprivation of prenatal care. 
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Even if plaintiff managed to surmount this difficulty, there 
would still remain the burden of proving the effectiveness of her 
chosen contraceptive method. 
Alternatively, plaintiff must prove that had she been given 
the choice to abort, she would have done so. Since plaintiff was 
incapable of consent,123 she must prove that her conservator/ 
guardian would have sought and been able to obtain a court or-
der authorizing the procedure.124 Because plaintiff's pregnancy 
was non-life threatening it is very unlikely that her conservator 
would have been able to persuade a court to order an abortion. 
If, however, plaintiff were able to meet the burden of proof re-
quired by the court she should be able to recover both general 
and special damages for wrongful birth. 
The court was rightfully solicitous of the possibilities of in-
fringing on mental patients' constitutional and statutory rights. 
In protecting plaintiff's rights of privacy, patient autonomy, and 
reproductive choice, however, the court may have denied the 
possibility of recovery to a plaintiff who suffered a legally cogni-
zable wrong. The court also failed to provide any guidance for 
medical care providers as to how best to safeguard the health 
and interests of institutionalized women of childbearing age. 
B. INTENTIONAL TORTS 
1. Cause of action for battery and deceit arising out of 
misrepresentation of sterility upheld. 
Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 
422 (1st Dist. 1983), (hearing denied) (Sept. 29, 1983). In Bar-
bara A. v. John G., the court addressed the question of whether 
or not a woman has a valid cause of action against a man with 
whom, because of his representation of sterility, she consents to 
have intercourse. The court held that the man's conduct was ac-
123. According to the terms of her conservatorship, plaintiff lacked the capacity to 
consent. 
124. The court cites Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 626, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. at 516, as an example of the extraordinary showing which would be required to 
obtain such an order. Maxon, however, concerned an order for sterilization where the 
patient's life was in danger, not therapeutic abortion for an incompetent. 
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tionable in tort and that the woman's complaint stated facts suf-
ficient to sustain actions for battery and deceit. Because of a 
preexisting attorney-client relationship between the parties, the 
woman also claimed that the man had breached his fiduciary 
duty toward her, as her attorney, because he did not act in good 
faith for her benefit with respect to their personal relationship. 
The court refused to hold the man to a professional fiduciary 
standard in his personal relationship with the woman as a mat-
ter of law. Instead, the court imposed the burden on the woman 
to show that the parties had not been dealing as equal adults in 
their personal relationship. 
Prior to engaging in sexual intercourse, the woman asked 
her male partner to use a condom. She told him that she would 
not engage in intercourse with him at the risk of pregnancy. In 
response to her request, the man stated, "I can't possibly get 
anyone pregnant." The woman interpreted ,the man's statement 
as a representation of sterility and therefore consented to inter-
course. Subsequently, she developed an ectopic pregnancyl2li 
which resulted in the loss of a fallopian tube and possible steril-
ity.126 The woman brought an action against the man alleging 
battery127 and misrepresentation (deceit).128 In sustaining the 
125. Ectopic pregnancy is a general medical term used to refer to any implantation 
of a fertilized ovum occurring outside of the uterine cavity. Although the location of an 
ectopic pregnancy may vary, its most common site, as in the instant case, is the fallopian 
tube. Ectopic pregnancy is a medical emergency which may lead to severe hemorrhage 
and death unless diagnosed promptly. "Once the diagnosis is made, operative treatment 
is indicated." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY E-8 (C.L. Thomas, M.D., M.P.H. 
ed. 12th ed. 4th printing 1973). 
126. Although the woman's pleadings alleged that she was sterile, she only claimed 
loss of one fallopian tube. Normally, one cannot be considered medically sterile unless 
both tubes are either lost or irreparably damaged. The court stated that the discrepancy 
was an issue for the trier of fact and did not deprive the woman of her cause of action. 
127. In the battery action, the woman contended that although she had consented 
to the intentional touching, her consent was vitiated in two ways: first, the resulting 
impregnation exceeded the scope of her consent and second, the consent had been fraud-
ulently induced. 
128. Civil Code section 1709 sanctions an action for fraudulent deceit, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1709 (Deering 1971), and Civil Code section 1710 defines deceit. CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1710 (Deering 1971). The essential elements of a deceit action are: 1) a false representa-
tion made by a defendant who; 2) had knowledge or belief that the representation was 
false or had no reasonable basis for believing it to be true; and 3) the false representation 
was made with the intent to induce the plaintiff to alter his or her position in reliance on 
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man's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court held 
that the woman's complaint failed to state a cause of action. The 
woman appealed. 
On appeal, the man argued that the woman's allegations 
were tantamount to an action for seduction. Civil Code section 
43.5129 prohibits a cause of action for seduction in California. 
Davis v. Stroud130 involved a seduction action that was filed a 
few days before the enactment of section 43.5. In Davis, the 
court stated, "[s]eduction imports the idea of illicit intercourse 
accomplished by the use of arts, persuasions,. or wiles to over-
come the resistance of a female who is not disposed of her own 
volition to step aside from the paths of virtue."131 Nothing in the 
Barbara A. complaint alleged inducement to intercourse against 
the woman's free will. In fact, she admitted that her consent was 
freely given. The essence of her complaint was that her consent 
was induced by a false representation, not because of any undue 
influence which prohibited her from exercising free will. The 
court held that the woman's cause of action had no substantive 
relationship to an action for seduction and therefore, section 
43.5 was inapplicable. 
In Stephen K. v. Roni L.,132 a woman allegedly misrepre-
sented to a man that she was taking oral contraceptives. In reli-
ance on her representation, the man engaged in sexual inter-
course with her. The woman became pregnant and a child, 
unwanted by the man, was born. The woman brought a pater-
nity action against the man. Admitting paternity, the man filed 
a cross complaint alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
and negligence.133 
The court in Stephen K. held that the man did not state a 
cause of action. It held that "as a matter of public policy the 
practice of birth control, if any, engaged in by two partners in a 
the misrepresentation; 4) the plaintiff justifiably relief upon the representation; and 5) 
suffered damage as a result of his or her reliance. 
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (Deering 1971). 
130. 52 Cal. App. 2d 308, 126 P.2d 409 (1942) (cited in P.2d as Briggs v. Stroud). 
131. [d. at 317, 126 P.2d at 414. 
132. 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980). 
133. He further alleged that as a proximate result of the woman's tortious conduct, 
he had suffered emotional distress secondary to a legal obligation to support an un-
wanted child. [d. at 642, Cal. Rptr. at 619. 
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consensual sexual relationship is best left to the individuals in-
volved, free from any government interference."134 Although the 
man in that case had allegedly been intentionally deceived, the 
Stephen K. court held that the privacy interests involved out-
weighed his interest in being compensated for the intentional 
wrong. 
The Barbara A. court pointed out that although a funda-
mental right to privacy does exist in matters relating to mar-
riage, family, and sex, the right is not absolute. The court stated 
that there are instances in which the individual's privacy inter-
ests are outweighed by compelling government concerns. Partic-
ularly, the court pointed out that in cases of spousal rape and 
paternity disputes, the parties cannot insulate themselves from 
judicial inquiry into their private sexual affairs. Therefore, the 
Barbara A. court held that the man could not preclude the wo-
man's cause of action by asserting a privacy interest because his 
privacy interest was substantially outweighed by the policy in 
favor of compensating individuals for injuries sustained as a re-
sult of intentional tortious conduct. 
Because of its approach to the privacy issue, the Barbara A. 
decision appears to be in direct conflict with that in Stephen K. 
However, the Barbara A. court agreed with the outcome in Ste-
phen K. but on different grounds. The court predicated its ap-
proval of Stephen K. on the promotion of the child's best inter-
est, rather than on privacy grounds, because Stephen K. was, in 
essence, a wrongful birth action against a parent based on de-
ceit.1311 The Barbara A. court reasoned that to allow a natural 
parent to recover for the "wrongful birth" of his or her own 
child would both decrease the availability of funds for the sup-
port of the child and possibly damage the child emotionally!36 
134. [d. at 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621. 
135. However, both Barbara A. and Stephen K. distinguished the actionable 
"wrongful birth" cases. The court in Barbara A. stated that "[t]he actions have uni· 
formly been instituted by parents against health professionals for negligence causing the 
birth of a child or the birth of an impaired child." Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 379 
n.S, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429; see also Stephen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 643-44, 164 Cal. Rptr. 
at 619-20 for a similar analysis. 
136. The court reasoned that such a cause of action would be strong evidence of 
parental rejection. 
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The court held that this result would be contrary to public pol-
icy and to a statutory duty imposed on both parents to support 
their child.1s7 Because the damages in Barbara A. stemmed from 
personal physical injury to the woman, rather than from the 
birth of a child, the court found that the policy considerations 
involved in Stephen K. were not applicable, and that a cause of 
action was stated. 
The Barbara A. court seems to be saying that when a child 
is involved, an intra parental tort claim for battery or deceit will 
be barred as against public policy, notwithstanding the underly-
ing merits of the cause of action. The Stephen K. court was con-
fronted with a factual situation which afforded ample opportu-
nity for the court to articulate clearly a rule barring 
intraparental tort claims where the damages alleged flow from 
the existence of an unwanted child. Yet, the Stephen K. court 
chose instead to focus on the privacy issue. 
The Barbara A. court has exposed the Stephen K. court's 
reluctance to confront the real issue before it. It has done so by 
stating that privacy rights are not absolute and must bow when 
stronger policy interests are compromised. It seems that where a 
child's best interest is at stake, tort claims between the parents 
will not be allowed. However, where there is no child to protect, 
there is no policy which justifies the denial of a valid tort action. 
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
A. SEX DISCRIMINATION 
1. Use of liquor license revocation to enforce Unruh Civil 
Rights Act upheld. 
Easebe Enterprises, Inc. v. Rice, 141 Cal. App. 3d 981, 190 
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1983). In Easebe Enterprises, Inc. v. Rice, the 
court of appeal upheld the revocation of a liquor license issued 
to a business enterprise practicing gender-based discrimination 
against male patrons. The court, in addition to finding that suffi-
137. Civil Code section 196a states in relevant part: "[tlhe father as well as the 
mother of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances." 
CAL. CIV. CODE 196a (Deering Supp. 1984). 
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cient evidence existed for the action, rejected arguments that 
the discrimination was appropriate or justified under the cir-
cumstances. The decision reinforces a statutory scheme mandat-
ing use of California's administrative bodies to eliminate dis-
crimination in business establishments. 
Responding to complaints that Chippendale's, a nightclub 
featuring "male exotic dancers," refused to admit men during 
performances, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control investigated, confirmed the allegations, and revoked the 
club's liquor license. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals 
Board upheld the revocation. 138 The court initially denied review 
of the Board's decision but the California Supreme Court, after 
granting a hearing, retransferred the case to it. 
The Unruh Civil Rights Actl39 guarantees equal access to 
business establishments for all persons, regardless of sex, race, 
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. Long considered a 
powerful statement of public policy, the Act has frequently been 
the basis for judicial elimination of various forms of discrimina-
tion.140 The California Legislature enacted Business and Profes-
sions Code section 125.6141 as another means of eliminating dis-
crimination. Any person. accepting a license under the Business 
smd Professions Code is subject to disciplinary action under sec-
tion 125.6 for discrimination based on race, coior, sex, reiigion, 
ancestry, physical handicap, marital status, or national origin. 
In reviewing the Department's decision, the Easebe court's 
inquiry was limited to the question of whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the revocation.142 After exammmg 
138. Easebee [sic] Enterprises, Inc., No. AB-4958, slip op. (1982). 
139. CAL. CIY. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
140. See, e.g., Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. 496 (1982) (landlord's "no children" policy violated Unruh Act); In re Cox, 3 Cal. 
3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970) (kinds of discrimination specified in Act 
serve only as illustrative, rather than restrictive, indicia of the bases of discrimination 
condemned); Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982) 
(landlords may not refuse to rent to homosexuals because of sexual preference). 
141. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6 (Deering Supp. 1983). 
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23090.2 (Deering Supp. 1983). See also Kirby v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 433, 436, 498 P.2d 1105, 1107, 102 Cal. 
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the testimony given at the administrative hearings, it found the 
evidence adequate to sustain a finding of sex discrimination. 
The court then reviewed the sources of the Department's 
authority to revoke a liquor license. It found that the California 
constitution granted to the Department unique power to admin-
ister licenses in accord with the state's public policy.143 It deter-
mined that the public policy to be enforced was the Unruh Act's 
ban on gender-based discrimination. 
The court also held the revocation action to be a valid exer-
cise of the Department's powers under provisions of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code. The Department had issued Chip-
pendale's a liquor license as a "public premises" under section 
23039 of the Business and Professions Code.I44 The court held 
that Chippendale's violated section 125.6 by discriminating in 
performing its licensed activity and was subject to disciplinary 
action. 
The importance of judicial support for a license revocation 
made under section 125.6 cannot be underestimated. The court 
could have based its support for the revocation action solely 
upon the special powers of the Department as found in the state 
constitution, but such a decision would have no significance for 
other departments with licensing powers granted in the Business 
and Professions Code. While damages and injunctive relief are 
available through the courts for violations of the Unruh Act 
under Civil Code section 52,145 this decision demonstrates judi-
cial approval of an alternative method of stopping sex discrimi-
nation through the economic power of licensing bodies. 
Chippendale's offered three arguments in support of its dis-
criminatory practices. It proposed that the practice was neces-
Rptr. 857, 859 (1972) (review of decision limited to whether findings are supported by 
substantial evidence). 
143. "The Department shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny, suspend or 
revoke any specific alcoholic beverage license if it shall determine for good cause that the 
granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to public welfare .... " CAL. 
CONST. art. 20, § 22. 
144. "[PJremises maintained and operated for the selling and serving of alcoholic 
beverages to the public for consumption on the premises .... " CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 
§ 23039 (Deering Supp. 1964). 
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
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sary to protect the rights of its male dancers to engage in a con-
stitutionally protected form of communication. The court held 
that withdrawing the privilege of selling alcoholic beverages did 
not preclude the continuation of the "communication" and so 
did not violate the First Amendment. 
Chippendale's also argued that the discriminatory policy 
was necessary for its economic survival since women customers 
would not attend performances if men were admitted. The court 
rejected this second argument, holding that the public policy of 
nondiscrimination must be enforced despite the possible detri-
mental effect to the business enterprise involved.146 
Finally, the court examined Chippendale's claim that its 
practices benefited women who had, as a group, been victims of 
past discrimination. While recognizing that the rationale of be-
nign discrimination had been accepted for certain governmental 
practices,147 the court adopted the Department's determination 
that public policy was better served by equal access for all per-
sons.148 The court went on to state in dictum, however, that if it 
had been the trier of fact it might have found the argument of 
benign motivation persuasive. If administrative bodies were ca-
pable of such decisions, their powers would be greatly expanded. 
Not only could a department find a iicensee guiiiy of discrimina-
tion, it could determine the action to be benignly inspired as a 
matter of fact and so permissible despite the Unruh Act or sec-
146. See also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 740, 640 P.2d 115, 126, 
180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 508 (1982) (entrepreneurs cannot pursue a broad status-based exclu-
sionary policy). 
147. The court specifically noted: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 
450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California law for statutory rape which punishes only 
males); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding regulation permitting fe-
male naval officers to remain in Navy a longer period before facing mandatory discharge 
for want of promotion than male officers); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (up-
holding statute granting widows, but not widowers, a property tax exemption). 
148. Among the Department's special findings was an unusual explanation of the 
balance involved: "In arguendo, on the one hand the determination as to whether the 
community is better served by a policy which provides a female audience an uninhibited 
environment in which to openly or boisterously express itself; and on the other hand a 
policy which provides to all persons, both males and females, unqualified access to public 
places. The latter is the fulcrum of an ordered society!" Quoted in Easebee [sic), No. AB-
4958, slip op. at 4. 
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tion 125.6. 
In approving the revocation action, the court enforced the 
legislative policy that gender-based discrimination is not to be 
tolerated in business establishments. The decision is significant 
because it supports the disciplinary powers granted administra-
tive bodies to enforce this policy. While the Unruh Act has been 
an important resource for combatting discrimination in the 
courts, Californians may now find that use of licensing bodies 
will prove an equally effective method to eliminate discrimina-
tion. Further, the dictum that these bodies may even approve 
benign discrimination would, if followed, expand their power to 
an unprecedented degree. 
B. AGE DISCRIMINATION 
1. Holding in Marina Point v. Wolfson extended to pre-
vent non-profit homeowners' association from discriminating 
against families with children. 
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, 33 Cal. 3d 
790,662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983). In O'Connor v. Vil-
lage Green Owners Association, the Supreme Court extended 
the holding in Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson149 to find that a 
restriction in the covenants, conditions and restrictions of a con-
dominium development limiting residency to persons age eigh-
teen and over is prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights Act.150 It 
held that the non-profit homeowners association set up by the 
developer which, in addition to maintenance duties, enforced the 
conditions, covenants and restrictions, was a "business establish-
ment" within the meaning of the Act and that such finding was 
consistent with the legislature's intent to use the term "business 
establishment" in the broadest sense possible. 
Plaintiffs, a married couple and owners of a unit in The Vil-
lage Green, had a child four years after moving into their condo-
minium. The association gave them notice that the presence of 
their son violated the age restrictive covenant and that he would 
have to vacate the premises. The couple filed suit to have the 
149. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982). 
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
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age restriction declared invalid and to enjoin its enforcement. 
The trial court sustained defendant association's demurrer with-
out leave to amend. When plaintiffs appealed, defendants filed 
for and were granted an injunction against plaintiffs' continued 
residency in the condominium. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Unruh Civil Rights Act states: "All persons within the 
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what 
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are en-
titled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every 
kind whatsoever."llil Although age discrimination is not specifi-
cally prohibited, the court had previously held in In re Cox that 
the Act's legislative history indicates that the specifically enu-
merated forms of discrimination were meant to be "illustrative 
rather than exhaustive. "1112 
In 1982 this court addressed discrimination against children 
in housing in Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson. 11l3 The circum-
stances in Marina Point differed from those here in one major 
respect. Plaintiffs in Marina Point were tenants in the building; 
here plaintiffs were owners of a unit in the development. In Ma-
rina Point, defendants were landlords of rental apartment.s; 
whereas here defendant was the condominium owners associa-
tion. The court in Marina Point reasoned that blanket exclusion 
of a class· of individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction 
that the class as a whole is more likely to become a nuisance 
than some other class was arbitrary and was prohibited by the 
Unruh Act.1II4 The court found that no compelling interest justi-
fied such discrimination. 
Since Marina Point was dispositive of the age discrimina-
tion issue, the O'Connor court found the determinative issue 
here to be whether the Association was a "business establish-
ment" within the meaning of the act. The defendants in 
151. [d. 
152. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 474 P.2d 992, 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1970). 
153. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982). 
154. Id. at 739, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507. 
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O'Connor contended that it was a private, non-profit organiza-
tion, whose members were the individual condominium owners, 
loosely organized as a maintenance body and as such not a "bus-
iness establishment" covered by the Act. The O'Connor court 
disagreed. 
In Burks v. Poppy Construction,165 the court examined the 
scope of the language "business establishment of every kind 
whatsoever." The court concluded that a real estate developer of 
housing tracts operated a business establishment within the 
meaning of the Act, and therefore was prohibited from discrimi-
nating on the basis of race when selling his homes. The court in 
Burks reasoned that the statute's lack of specification of particu-
lar kinds of enterprises left "no doubt that the term 'business 
establishments' was used in the broadest sense reasonably possi-
ble."l66 Furthermore, the Burk court noted that the original ver-
sion of the bill made specific references to types of businesses 
intended to be covered. These original references included pri-
vate or public groups, organizations, and associations. The court 
reasoned that the deletion of specific references in the bill's final 
version and the substitution of the phrase "of every kind what-
soever" broadened the scope of the term "business establish-
ments," and therefore is indicative of a legislative intent to in-
clude, as formerly specified, private and public groups or 
organizations that might reasonably be found to constitute a 
business. 
The court in O'Connor followed Burk and found that The 
Village Green Owner's Association was a business establishment 
because its overall function was to "protect and enhance the 
project's economic value," and it functioned very much like a 
business in performing its multiple duties. 
Defendant also contended that it had fewer effective reme-
dies since it could not use the summary procedure of unlawful 
detainer available to landlords to remedy nuisances caused by 
disruptive or mischievous children. The court found this argu-
ment unpersuasive. It reasoned that the association could adopt 
deportment regulations and sufficiently rely on its normal proce-
155. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962). 
156. Id. at 468, 370 P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612. 
47
et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
832 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:785 
dures to enforce them as it would in enforcing other use and 
conduct regulations. 
The Marina Point court recognized a strong social interest 
in prohibiting discrimination against children in housing. The 
court stated: "[a] society that sanctions wholesale discrimination 
against its children in obtaining housing engages in suspect ac-
tivity."167 In refusing to sanction the discrimination in the in-
stant case by private, non-profit organizations, the O'Connor 
court has correctly interpreted the objective of the Unruh Actl118 
which is to prohibit all forms of arbitrary discrimination by 
"business establishments engaged in the sale or rental of real 
property. "1119 
Justice Broussard concurred in the court's opinion but also 
made an additional argument for prohibition of any discrimina-
tion in housing based on California Civil Code section 53.160 He 
found section 53 to be more to the point since its language spe-
cifically prohibits discrimination in the "conveyance, encum-
brance, leasing or mortgaging of real property." Section 53 lists 
the same prohibited discriminations as section 51 and makes 
any such discriminatory use of real property void regardless of 
whether or not it is done by a business establishment. 
Justice Mosk dissented for two reasons. First, he argued 
that including age in the scope of prohibited discriminations was 
creating legislation "in an area in which the legislature has de-
liberately refused to [act]."161 Second, he contended that charac-
terizing the homeowners association as a business was an unrea-
sonable extension of the statute. 
The legislature, however, has for good reason not included 
age in the enumerated prohibitions. The statute's language is 
too broad for it. If age were included, it would not be unreasona-
ble to conclude that children of any age could demand to be 
157. 30 Cal. 3d at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. 
158. Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
159. 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975). 
160. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering Supp. 1984). 
161. 33 Cal. 3d at 801, 662 P.2d at 434, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 327. 
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served alcohol in saloons and restaurants, or could demand ad-
mission to adult theatre houses. Additionally, if homeowners' as-
sociations were not construed as "business establishments," they 
would hypothetically be allowed to discriminate against future 
buyers on whatever basis contained within their conditions, cov-
enants and restrictions, including sex, race or national origin, 
and there is no reasonable justification for such an exemption 
from the Unruh Act's requirements. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. NONMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Relocation with "nonmarital loved one" is not good 
cause for termination of employment under Unemployment In-
surance Code. 
Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 34 
Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983), (rehearing 
denied) (June 6, 1983). In Norman v. Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board, the California Supreme Court addressed the 
question whether voluntary termination of employment in order 
to relocate with a "nonmarital loved one"162 constitutes "good 
cause" within the meaning of California Unemployment Insur-
ance Code section 1256.163 In a four to three decision, the court 
held that termination under such circumstances does not fall 
within the purview of "good cause" under section 1256 unless 
the claimant establishes that marriage is imminent.164 
162. The court uses the term "nonmarital loved one" even though the facts in the 
instant case specifically refer to a girlfriend/boyfriend relationship. One may speculate 
that the court intentionally chose this term to cover all types of relationships, including 
those that have no possibility of becoming marital. 
163. Section 1256 provides in pertinent part: "An individual is disqualified for un-
employment compensation benefits if the director finds that he left his most recent work 
voluntarily without good cause .... " CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (Deering 1971). 
164. The court stated that "good cause" is also shown where a claimant establishes 
that the move is precipitated by a marriage-related obligation or that actual presence in 
the new location is necessary to implement marriage-related plans. 34 Cal. 3d at 9, 663 
P.2d at 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139. 
In response to the trial court decision in Norman, the California Legislature 
amended section 1256. The amendment expressly affords a spouse "good cause" when he 
or she voluntarily terminates employment to relocate with his or her spouse. CAL. 
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
The Norman court also stated that its decision did not violate the claimant's consti-
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A woman quit her employment in order to relocate to an-
other state with her boyfriend,l6& with whom she had been living 
for three years. She subsequently filed a claim for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits with the California Employment 
Development Department. The Department determined that no 
"good cause" existed for the termination and denied her claim. 
The determination was reaffirmed both on administrative appeal 
and on appeal to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. 
Claimant then brought suit in superior court.166 The trial court 
held that "good cause" had been established and awarded bene-
fits. 167 The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and the 
Department joined in appealing the trial court decision. 
Section 1256 allows a claimant to collect benefits despite the 
voluntary nature of employment termination, provided "good 
cause" is established. In 1980, new regulations were promulgated 
by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.168 As noted by 
the dissent, the regulations in effect create a presumption in 
favor of a person about to become married. Specifically, the new 
regulations describe circumstances under which "good cause" is 
established for a voluntary quit: "Such circumstances are con-
sidered 'good cause' if the claimant's obligation is of a real, sub-
stantial, and compelling nature . . . and the claimant's reason 
for leaving work is due to a legal or moral obligation related to, 
inter alia, the existing or prospective marital status of the claim-
tutional rights of privacy and freedom of association. The court refused to characterize 
the nature of claimant's relationship with her boyfriend as one akin to a marital relation-
ship. Therefore, the court determined that no fundamental privacy right had been de-
nied her. Claimant was not denied the right to relocate with her boyfriend. Therefore, 
the court found that no violation of the right to associate freely had occurred. The court 
stated that the fact that she had been denied benefits because of her actions did not 
infringe her right to free association. 
165. Claimant testified that she became engaged to be married four months after 
terminating her employment and that a marriage date was set for four months after the 
date of engagement. 
166. Suit was brought in superior court by petition for a writ of mandate. C~. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (Deering 1973). 
167. While recognizing that "good cause" is an issue of law as established in Perales 
v. Department of Human Resources Dev., 32 Cal. App. 3d 332, 336, 108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 
170 (1973), the trial court stated: "[T)he absence of any marital relationship [does) not, 
as a matter of law, preclude an award of unemployment compensation benefits." Nor-
man, 34 Cal. 3d at 4, 663 P.2d at 906, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 136. 
168. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, R. 1256-1·1256-43 (1980). 
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ant. 169 The Norman court, while not bound by the 1980 regula-
tions, relied on them for guidance as to the legislative purpose in 
enacting section 1256, particularly its intended construction of 
"good cause. "170 
The Norman court also considered another administrative 
regulation, California Administrative Code section 1256-12, 
which expressly states that marriage or imminence of marriage 
may constitute "good cause" for the purposes of section 1256.171 
Coupling the language of the proposed regulation with that of 
section 1256-12, the court deduced that section 1256 should be 
interpreted to facilitate the overriding legislative scheme, that is, 
a scheme which prefers the establishment and maintenance of 
marital relationships. The Norman court concluded that any ju-
dicial determination of "good cause" must be consistent with 
that policy. Finally, the court pointed out that requiring a show-
ing of marriage or imminence thereof alleviates many of the 
proof problems associated with a case by case analysis of the 
"good cause" worthiness of any given relationship. Alleviation of 
proof problems in order to facilitate administrative convenience 
has been recognized as a legitimate government interest. How-
ever, that interest must be balanced against the risk of depriving 
individuals of important, perhaps even essential, means of 
support.172 
The claimant in Norman argued that her nonmarital rela-
tionship was the equivalent of a marriage for purposes of deter-
mining "good cause." In Marvin v. Marvin,I73 the California Su-
preme Court held that a non married partner in a relationship 
has a valid cause of action against her partner where the com-
plaining partner can show that an express or implied agreement 
exists between them and that a breach of that agreement has 
169. Norman, 34 Cal. 3d at 8, 663 P.2d at 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (quoting CAL. 
ADMIN. CODE, tit. 22, R. 1256-9 (1980». 
170. Because the regulations are published by the administrative agency and not the 
legislature, they are not direct evidence of legislative intent. However, they are given 
great weight in the court's determination of legislative intent. Judson Steel Corp. v. 
Workers' Compo Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 658, 668, 586 P.2d 564, 570, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250, 
256 (1978). 
171. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 22, R. 1256-12 (1980). 
172. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
173. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). 
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occurred. Citing several cases which limit the application of 
Marvin/7• the Norman court stated that Marvin applies only to 
a contractual or quasi-contractual agreement regarding the 
property rights as to each party when the relationship termi-
nates. In dicta, the Marvin court stated: "The structure of soci-
ety itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and 
nothing we have said in this ,opinion should be taken to derogate 
from that institution."l75 Therefore, stated the court in Norman, 
it is left for the legislature to determine whether all Marvin-like 
relationships should be generally afforded the extensive statu-
tory protections given to legal marriages. In the absence of such 
legislation, the Norman court refused to characterize the rela-
tionship in the instant case as one deserving Marvin protection. 
In Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers' Compo 
Appeals Bd.,176 the court of appeal held that a nonmarital part-
ner is entitled to death benefits consistent with Labor Code sec-
tion 3503.177 Section 3503 provides in relevant part: "No person 
is a dependent of any deceased employee unless in good faith a 
member of the family or household of the employee .... " 
Claimant in the instant case argued that Department of Indus-
trial Relations is applicable to her case insofar as it allowed a 
nonmarital partner to collect benefits under a statute which, like 
section 1256, did not expressly Ihnit those benefits to married 
persons. 
Distinguishing Department of Industrial Relations, the 
Norman court pointed out that the unmarried partner in De-
partment of Industrial Relations was expressly provided for 
under section 3503 because section 3503 requires only a showing 
of good faith family participation and some dependency on the 
deceased employee. Therefore, the Norman court concluded that 
174. See generally In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal. Rptr. 
826 (1982) (prohibiting nonmarital partner from overnight visitations with an inmate). 
People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1979) (refusal to extend the 
marital communications privilege to nonmarital partners); Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft 
Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1982) (Surviving nonmarital partner pro-
hibited from bringing wrongful death action on behalf of deceased partner). 
175. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
176. 94 Cal. App. 3d 72, 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979). 
177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3503 (Deering Supp. 1984). 
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Department of Industrial Relations was inapposite and pointed 
out that claimant's right to collect was not expressly granted 
under section 1256. However, as pointed out by the dissent, sec-
tion 1256 no more excludes unmarried persons than does section 
3505. Section 1256 simply states that "good cause" must be 
shown for leaving employment, and the related regulations only 
create a presumption of "good cause" where marriage or immi-
nent marriage are present. The majority's analysis denies claim-
ant any opportunity to prove good cause even without taking 
advantage of the presumption. The Norman court has effectively 
precluded all those who have close and ongoing nonmarital rela-
tionships from being able to establish "good cause" for volunta-
rily terminating employment to relocate with a significant other, 
except where marriage is "imminent." The court cited public 
policy favoring marriage as its rationale; however, it is not clear 
that the policy would be undermined by allowing unmarried 
parties with no marital plans to prove "good cause." To deny 
them the right to attempt such proof is to penalize them for 
their nonmarital relationship by taking away a right which is 
available to others under section 1256. As pointed out by the 
dissent, the trial court did not apply the presumption which the 
regulations afford married individuals. Instead, it made a legal 
finding that claimant had established "good cause." The Su-
preme Court's decision in Norman denies claimant the right to 
establish "good cause" under section 1256, even without benefit 
of the presumption. If Norman stands for the proposition that 
nonmarital couples whose marriage is not imminent have no 
chance of establishing "good cause," presumptions aside, then 
the court has rendered the legislatively created opportunity to 
establish "good cause" virtually meaningless in many situations 
in which parties need to relocate in order to be near someone for 
whom they love and care. 








et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
